Abstract
This article investigates whether qualitative information provided by banks about risk appetite (RA) sheds substantive insight on their effective risk taking (RT) and whether this latter in turn affects RA disclosure, as well as the role played by specific types of banks' reports (i.e., integrated report, annual report, Pillar 3 report) on such relations. Using a sample of 134 reports representing 52 banks, a generalized structural equation model is applied. The article hypothesizes and empirically finds a reciprocal relation between RA disclosure and banks' RT. More specifically, in line with agency theory, the analysis displays a predominance of the inverse relation according to which banks showing higher RT provide greater disclosure. In addition, RT is found to play a mediator role between the adoption of a specific type of report—the integrated report—and RA disclosure, independently of the context in which the banks operate. Results also highlight that RT in banks adopting an integrated report is lower than the one of matched banks. Overall, this study extends risk science by complementing the literature stream on banks' accounting discretion and risk disclosure, supporting the impact of market discipline in promoting new forms of corporate reporting. Results indeed emphasize the key role of integrated reporting on RT, suggesting that integrated logic should be strengthened by policy makers to curb banks' excessive RT and leading them to provide substantive disclosure.
