Abstract
This dissertation focuses on the role that group-based compliance programmes could play in the context of the attribution of antitrust liability within groups of companies, with regard in particular to the limitation or exclusion of the parent company liability for the infringement carried out by its subsidiary. To this end, the paper examines first the Commission's practice and the relevant ECJ's case-law, in order to ascertain under which conditions the parent company can be held responsible for the unlawful conduct of its subsidiary, even if it was not directly involved in the infringement. During this analysis special attention has been paid to the "Akzo Nobel presumption" according to which a company holding all, or almost all, the capital of a subsidiary is presumed to have exercised decisive influence over the conduct of its subsidiary. The paper then proceeds to analyse the criticisms variously moved by the literature towards such an allocation mechanism of liability with particular reference to its compatibility both with the fundamental principles of personal responsibility and culpability, and with the presumption of innocence, which apply to antitrust sanctions given their essentially criminal nature. The dissertation also provides a personal opinion on the current allocation mechanism of liability within groups of companies, in the attempt to suggest an interpretation that appears suitable, on the one hand, with the rationale of the single economic entity doctrine and with the general purposes of competition law, and, on the other hand, with the principles of personal liability, culpability and corporate legal personality. Having regard to these considerations, it is last examined whether the adoption of antitrust compliance programmes could determine any limitation or exclusion of liability of the parent company. According to this purpose, the paper analyses both the case-law and the existing literature, in order to provide, finally, a personal answer to the research question.