Abstract
This essay examines the main characters of the ECB within the EMU, in the light of the very recent enlargement of the European Union. The Author studies the institutional aspects of the ECB, with particular attention to the following specific issues: the Governing Council - main body of the ECB -, and its voting system; the wide independence and the consequent limited accountability of the Bank. As to the voting system of the Governing Council, the Author is very critical both on the recent reform, approved in order to face at the enlargement, and on the official and dominant opinion, according to which the national governors, when sitting in the Council, should pursue the common interest of the so called Euro zone. On the contrary, in this seat they should represent their States, and claim the interests and the claims of the same. As to the accountability of the Bank, the Author upholds a greater involvement of the European Parliament, at the moment provided with very few powers in the matter.