Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://arl.liuc.it/dspace/handle/2468/6183
Title: Influential listeners: an experiment on persuasion bias in social networks
Authors: Corazzini, Luca
Pavesi, Filippo
Petrovich, Beatrice
Stanca, Luca
Issue Date: 2012
Publisher: Elsevier
Bibliographic citation: Corazzini Luca, et al. (2012), Influential listeners: an experiment on persuasion bias in social networks. In: European economic review, vol. 56, n. 6, August 2012, p. 1276-1288. ISSN 0014-2921. DOI 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.05.005.
Abstract: This paper presents an experimental investigation of persuasion bias, a form of bounded rationality whereby agents communicating through a social network are unable to account for repetitions in the information they receive. We find that, after repeated communication within a social network, social influence depends not only on being listened to by many others, but also on listening to many others. We show that persuasion bias can be viewed as an extreme case of a generalized boundedly rational updating rule in which agents receive more or less attention depending on how many other agents they listen to. The results indicate that behavior in the experiment is consistent with an updating rule according to which agents' social influence is proportional to their indegree.
URI: http://arl.liuc.it/dspace/handle/2468/6183
Journal/Book: European economic review
ISSN: 0014-2921
Appears in Collections:Contributo in rivista

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