Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://arl.liuc.it/dspace/handle/2468/5851
Title: Auctioneers vs. commissaires-priseurs: The carnival mirror of profession regulation in the international art market
Authors: Lazzaro, Elisabetta
Moureau, Nathalie
Issue Date: 2013
Publisher: European Association for Comparative Economic Studies (EACES)
Università Carlo Cattaneo - LIUC
Bibliographic citation: Lazzaro Elisabetta, Moureau Nathalie (2013), Auctioneers vs. commissaires-priseurs: The carnival mirror of profession regulation in the international art market. In: The European Journal of Comparative Economics, vol. 10, n. 2, 2013, p. 159-176. E-ISSN 1824-2979.
Abstract: This paper is a comparative analysis of the recent evolution of the French and the Anglo-Saxon profession regulations of auctioneers in terms of entry barriers and exercise of the profession. Firstly, following Stephen and Love's (1999) framework of the regulation of legal profession, we highlight the differences between regulations focussing on different levels (entry restrictions, advertising, fees, fee contracts, and organisational form). We show that French commissaire-priseurs and Anglo-Saxon auctioneers are bounded to quite opposed rules, relating to both the level of regulation (licensing against registration or certification) and the scope of this regulation. Secondly, we try to assess the success of these regulations in terms of economic efficiency by comparing the international markets shares of French and Anglo-Saxon auctioneers. We further highlight how a weak regulation can disturb prices mechanisms and, in some cases, favour speculation. The discussion of some emblematic scandals highlights distortions provoked by a strong, as well as a weak regulation.
URI: http://arl.liuc.it/dspace/handle/2468/5851
Journal/Book: The European journal of comparative economics
Appears in Collections:EJCE

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