Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://arl.liuc.it/dspace/handle/2468/5686
Title: How tight is too tight? A look at welfare implications of distortionary policies in Uzbekistan
Authors: Gemayel, Edward R.
Grigorian, David A.
Issue Date: 2006
Publisher: European Association for Comparative Economic Studies (EACES)
Università Carlo Cattaneo - LIUC
Bibliographic citation: Gemayel Edward R., Grigorian David A. (2006), How tight is too tight? A look at welfare implications of distortionary policies in Uzbekistan. In: The European Journal of Comparative Economics, vol. 3, n. 2, 2006, p. 239-261. E-ISSN 1824-2979.
Abstract: Since independence in 1991, Uzbekistan has pursued a gradual approach to the transition from planned to market economy. This approach relied heavily on trade controls, directed credit, and large public investments. In addition, a number of financial sector measures were instituted that distorted resource allocation and increased transaction costs. As a result, while possibly preventing the contraction of output in the early 1990s, these policies led to disappointing economic outcomes and social conditions later on. The paper reviews the underlying distortions and presents survey-based evidence to support their existence and their detrimental impact on economic activity. Looking forward, the paper - using a representative agent framework to model existing financial sector distortions - offers some guidance regarding the likely implications of eliminating these distortions on key aggregate variables. It suggests that the elimination of these distortions will be welfare enhancing and will lead to higher levels of investment and capital stock.
URI: http://arl.liuc.it/dspace/handle/2468/5686
Journal/Book: The European journal of comparative economics
Appears in Collections:EJCE

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