Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://arl.liuc.it/dspace/handle/2468/5676
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dc.creatorBilotkach, Volodymyr-
dc.date.accessioned2018-07-13T15:54:09Z-
dc.date.available2018-07-13T15:54:09Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.urihttp://arl.liuc.it/dspace/handle/2468/5676-
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines the issue of tax evasion by enterprises through underreporting activity. We develop a view of this phenomenon as an equilibrium of the game between a businessman and an imperfectly monitored supervising official, in which a businessman can hide part of his profit and offer bribe to official. We determine conditions under which such tax evasion and bribery become wide-spread in the society, resulting in shadow economy. The game is put into an experimental setting in Kiev, Ukraine, with the emphasis of spreading of the tax evasion and bribery activity in the laboratory setting. We find that once it becomes known that substantial share of subjects playing the role of supervising officials agree to accept bribes from subjects playing the role of businessmen, the latter offer bribes more aggressively. Yet, this in turn does not affect the behavior of subjects playing the role of supervising officials.en
dc.formatOnlineen
dc.languageenen
dc.publisherEuropean Association for Comparative Economic Studies (EACES)en
dc.publisherUniversità Carlo Cattaneo - LIUCit
dc.relation.ispartofThe European journal of comparative economicsen
dc.rightshttp://www.biblio.liuc.it/pagineita.asp?codice=247-
dc.titleA tax evasion - bribery game: experimental evidence from Ukraineen
dc.typeArticolo in rivista internazionale referenziatait
dc.subject.keywordsTax evasionen
dc.subject.keywordsBriberyen
dc.subject.keywordsExperimenten
dc.subject.keywordsLearning in gamesen
prism.urlhttp://eaces.liuc.it/18242979200601/182429792006030103.pdf-
dc.identifier.bibliographiccitationVolodymyr Bilotkach (2006), A tax evasion - bribery game: experimental evidence from Ukraine. In: The European Journal of Comparative Economics, vol. 3, n. 1, 2006, p. 31-49. E-ISSN 1824-2979.it
dc.type.refereedanonymousen
dc.identifier.eissn1824-2979-
dc.relation.firstpage31-
dc.relation.lastpage49-
dc.relation.issue1, 2006-
dc.relation.volume3-
dc.type.publicationstatuspubblicatoit
dc.accessrightsopenAccessen
dc.publisher.countryITAen
dc.publisher.placeCastellanzait
dc.subject.jelCodeH26-
dc.subject.jelCodeC91-
dc.subject.jelCodeD73-
dc.subject.jelCodeH32-
dc.audienceAccademicoit
dc.rights.licenseCC BY-ND 4.0-
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