Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://arl.liuc.it/dspace/handle/2468/5676
Title: A tax evasion - bribery game: experimental evidence from Ukraine
Authors: Bilotkach, Volodymyr
Issue Date: 2006
Publisher: European Association for Comparative Economic Studies (EACES)
Università Carlo Cattaneo - LIUC
Bibliographic citation: Volodymyr Bilotkach (2006), A tax evasion - bribery game: experimental evidence from Ukraine. In: The European Journal of Comparative Economics, vol. 3, n. 1, 2006, p. 31-49. E-ISSN 1824-2979.
Abstract: This paper examines the issue of tax evasion by enterprises through underreporting activity. We develop a view of this phenomenon as an equilibrium of the game between a businessman and an imperfectly monitored supervising official, in which a businessman can hide part of his profit and offer bribe to official. We determine conditions under which such tax evasion and bribery become wide-spread in the society, resulting in shadow economy. The game is put into an experimental setting in Kiev, Ukraine, with the emphasis of spreading of the tax evasion and bribery activity in the laboratory setting. We find that once it becomes known that substantial share of subjects playing the role of supervising officials agree to accept bribes from subjects playing the role of businessmen, the latter offer bribes more aggressively. Yet, this in turn does not affect the behavior of subjects playing the role of supervising officials.
URI: http://arl.liuc.it/dspace/handle/2468/5676
Journal/Book: The European journal of comparative economics
Appears in Collections:EJCE

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